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Abstract: : The emergence of ￿at money is studied in an environment in which exchange is organized
around trading posts where many producers and shoppers are matched in a dynamic monopolistically
competitive framework. Each household consumes a bundle of commodities and has a preference
for consumption variety. Within this multiple matching structure we determine the endogenous
organization of exchange between ￿rms and shoppers and the means of factor payment (remuneration)
as well as the price at which these trades occur. Although each household contacts many sellers,
the specialization of tastes implies that the variety of the consumption basket under barter mediated
exchange is sparser than that obtained under monetary exchange. We verify that the endogenous
linkage of factor payments with the medium of exchange can lead to a monetary equilibrium outcome
where only ￿at money trades for goods, an ex-ante feature of cash-in-advance models. We also
examine the long-run e⁄ects of money growth on the equilibrium pattern of exchange. A primary
￿nding, consistent with documented hyperin￿ ationary episodes, is that a su¢ ciently rapid expansion
of money supply and in￿ ation leads to the gradual emergence of barter. Under these circumstances
sellers will accept both goods and cash payments whereas workers receive part of their remuneration
in goods.
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In two pioneering contributions, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) advanced an in￿ uential search-
equilibrium framework that provides a microeconomic foundation for the endogenous use of ￿at
money. More speci￿cally, although ￿at money has no prescribed a priori role in their model, it may
well emerge endogenously as a universally accepted medium of exchange in equilibrium. By appealing
to trade (search) frictions and taste di⁄erences, their framework elegantly captures the advantages
of monetary exchange vis Æ vis barter as that of overcoming the problem of the double coincidence
of wants. Their early work has inspired a huge literature that has sought to generalize the stylized
assumptions of the early search-money models, so as to extend its ambit to permit the analysis of
substantive issues in monetary economics, such as in￿ ation, money and growth, and monetary policy,
more generally circumscribed.1
Nevertheless, what was perhaps not initially well appreciated was the theoretical depth of their
early contributions. In particular, it is now well understood that Kiyotaki and Wright￿ s (KW) search-
equilibrium framework not only o⁄ers penetrating insights into the foundations of monetary exchange,
but it is also increasingly becoming clear that the themes they emphasize (informational imperfections
rooted in spatial separation and heterogeneous preferences) are also central to understanding of the
nature and organization of exchange itself.
The signi￿cance of this observation is that it is possible to construct richer models in which ￿at
money not only remains essential, but which also capture substantive issues of interest concerning the
organization of trade. For example, recently Howitt (2005, p.405) has remarked that, in contrast to
the random pairwise matching environment frequently used in the literature, ￿[E]xchanges in actual
market economies are organized by specialist traders, who mitigate search costs by providing facilities
that are easy to locate. Thus, when people wish to buy shoes they go to a shoe store; when they are
hungry they go to a grocer. ... Few people would think of planning their economic lives on the basis
of random encounters with non specialists.￿
The primary contribution of this paper is to take this research program a step further. To this
end, instead of dealing with what have essentially been yeoman farmer economies, in which agents
trade their own-produced products on the market via a process of random bilateral search (as in the
early contributions of KW) or in well-organized stores (as in Howitt), we consider an environment
in which production occurs in identi￿able ￿rms, using the labor supplied by households, and in
which households purchase an assortment of goods from these ￿rms. Most importantly, in this richer
setting, our framework is able to integrate the role of ￿at money as the principal means whereby
households purchase goods and whereby ￿rms make factor payments (in particular, the payment of
1These ￿rst generation models assumed goods and money were indivisible and agents could only store one object
at a time. See Rupert, Shevchenko, Schindler, and Wright (2000) and Li (2001) for a detailed review of the origins of
this literature as well as earlier extensions of the prototype model to include price setting mechanisms.
1a monetary wage to workers). For example, in modern economies, steelworkers are typically paid
in cash rather than in steel bars, and they subsequently use their cash earnings to purchase other
goods. The emphasis upon typically is important, for under certain (usually extreme) circumstances
workers may well be paid in both cash and kind and subsequently attempt to barter the goods that
their employers pay them.
Instead of bilateral exchange via individual random encounters, as typical in most monetary search
models, we advance a multiple-matching approach wherein buyers (households) and sellers (￿rms)
meet to trade their goods and services at a common trading post.2 Only ￿rms possess a production
technology and, in order to produce output they must elicit labor services from households via suitable
factor (wage) payments. Hence our market structure resembles how transactions of goods and labor
are organized in modern monetary economies. Our model possesses three distinctive features:
￿ Although individual preferences are specialized (in that not every household desires every good),
households have a strict preference for consuming a variety of goods, which they accomplish
by purchasing baskets of commodities.
￿ The multiple-matching market structure is one in which each buyer sequentially meets a large
number (a positive measure) of sellers every period, which overcomes the notorious distribu-
tional problems that are common in conventional money-search models.
￿ Each worker￿ s remuneration can be in the form of goods or money ￿ that is, both the means
of factor payments and the means of purchasing ￿nal goods and services are endogenously
determined in equilibrium.
Consonant with our emphasis upon the importance of product variety, we consider monopolis-
tically competitive environment. This adds a strategic pricing mechanism that is not captured by
the canonical Walrasian framework. We focus on steady-state symmetric Nash equilibria. The main
￿ndings of the paper are summarized below.
First, we establish existence of a pure-barter equilibrium (PBE) in which money is not valued
and workers are paid in kind. The potential absence of a monetary equilibrium is, of course, a
desideratum in any model that seeks to provide an equilibrium role for money. We then study
conditions which lead to the emergence of monetary equilibria. In particular, we show that for a
su¢ ciently low rate of nominal money growth there is an equilibrium in which money is valued, and
is used on one side of every transaction (the pure monetary equilibrium (PME)).3 If, however, the
rate of monetary expansion is su¢ ciently high ￿ with a concomitantly rapid rate of in￿ ation ￿ the
2The multiple-matching approach was ￿rst advanced in Laing, Li, and Wang (2007), but in an environment in which
barter could play no role.
3As in Howitt (2005), this feature of our model is an equilibrium outcome; it does not call for special assumptions
being made concerning the joint distribution of tastes and endowments ￿ the Wicksellian triangle.
2PME is nonsustainable, and barter emerges. This leads to the mixed-trading equilibrium (MTE),
which is characterized by the coexistence of monetary and barter exchange.
We examine equilibrium welfare levels within the context of these three equilibrium outcomes.
Critically, in the PBE the consumption basket that emerges is sparser (as measured by the variety of
goods that are consumed) than in either the PME or the MTE. In the latter two settings, households
need only locate a good they want, while in the former setting the more stringent double coincidence
of wants must be satis￿ed in order for trade to take place. Thus, our model points to the drawback
of barter, relative to monetary exchange, as stemming from atemporal trade frictions that stymie
consumption variety. This stands in contrast to the temporal frictions emphasized by the (random)
search literature, in which the absence of a double coincidence of wants reduces the frequency of
trade and consumption. Also, within the PME, the endogenously chosen means of factor payments
consists of only cash which gives rise to a cash-in-advance constraint in the goods market as an
equilibrium outcome.
We show that, although the quantity of money is neutral (i.e., level changes have no e⁄ect on
real variables), changes in the growth rate of the money supply can have important real e⁄ects
upon equilibrium outcomes that are not present in Walrasian models, nor recent search-theoretic
ones. More speci￿cally, as remarked upon earlier, one of the key innovations of our structure is an
endogenous link between the medium of exchange and the means of factor payments. Consequently,
an increase in the money growth rate can shift the entire pattern of equilibrium exchange as the
PME unravels and the MTE emerges. Furthermore, within the MTE the rate of in￿ ation and the
volume of barter transactions are positively related (indeed, in the limiting case the MTE converges
to the PBE). This ￿nding is consistent with a commonly observed phenomena occurring during
hyperin￿ ationary episodes, in which sellers accept both goods and cash and workers often receive
part of their remuneration in the form of their employer￿ s output.
Related Literature
There is now a signi￿cant literature that emphasizes the importance of explicit microfoundations for
monetary exchange. It is useful to highlight those features of our model which are most fundamental
to our results, and to compare our relative contributions to those approaches that have been widely
used in the literature.
First, in our model, the root cause of the double-coincidence problem arises because households
possess heterogeneous tastes which are de￿ned over a continuum of di⁄erent product varieties. In this
context, the preference for consumption variety is essential for the emergence of equilibrium monetary
exchange. Indeed, ￿at money is useful only because it expands trading opportunities, allowing agents
to procure a wider variety of consumption goods. The preference for variety provides an additional
motive for the use of money not previously examined in the literature. Moreover, as will become
3clear below, this feature provides a tractable way of overcoming some of the more refractory issues
that arise in monetary search models.
Second, instead of pursuing a bilateral bargaining approach [cf. Trejos and Wright (1995)] one
of the main innovations of this paper is incorporating a Dixit-Stiglitz (1990) style monopolistically-
competitive pricing structure into a monetary model. Such a structure provides a natural pricing
mechanism in the presence of product di⁄erentiation. Furthermore, aggregate models with monop-
olistic competition [cf. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)] have proven to be an extremely versatile
vehicle for analyzing a host of macroeconomic issues. Nevertheless, monetary models in this class
invoke the use of money a priori, either by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint, or by assuming
that money is included as an argument in the utility function. Hence, they are not well suited to
study issues like how the use of money improves welfare or how monetary policy in￿ uences exchange
patterns.
Third, given that our model explicitly incorporates separate goods and labor markets, we can
articulate the endogenous link between the means of factor payments and the medium of exchange.
Indeed, it is precisely through this channel that (i) we endogenize the equilibrium cash-in-advance
outcome, in which barter fails to emerge, and so cash is used on one side of every transaction, and
(ii) we can link in￿ ation to the equilibrium pattern of exchange (giving rise to the MTE outlined
earlier).
Fourth, our multiple matching approach naturally leads to a degenerate distribution of money
and inventory holdings by ironing out, as it were, the vicissitudes of the random trading environment.
This feature o⁄ers an extremely tractable means of studying issues in monetary and macroeconomic
settings that incorporate explicit trade frictions.4 Hence this aspect of our framework is similar in
spirit to the contributions of Shi (1997) and more recently, Lagos and Wright (2005) who construct
environments that are amenable for studying monetary policy in search-theoretic settings.5
Fifth, and most importantly, this paper is obviously related to Howitt (2005), and by extension
Starr and Stinchcombe (1999).6 Howitt neatly integrates the informational and spatial frictions,
emphasized by search theory, into a market exchange process organized around well de￿ned shops
4The random nature of sequential search implies that direct extensions of the Kiyotaki-Wright framework generally
lead to an endogenous distribution of cash and inventory holdings. The resulting distributions are analytically complex,
limiting the applicability of these models [e.g., see Corbae and Camera (1999), Molico (2006) and papers cited therein].
5Shi accomplishes this task in an environment with each household populated by a continuum of members, ensuring
there is no trading uncertainty at the household level. Lagos and Wright (2005) rely on the presence of a Walrasian
auctioneer who coordinates the trade of a ￿general good￿in a market that opens after the search market closes (i.e., ￿
day￿versus ￿night￿markets).
6Starr and Stinchombe develop a structure organized around an endogenous trading post network, in which each
shop at a particular location optimally chooses to trade a specialized good for a common commodity money. Much of
this recent literature is rooted in the celebrated contribution of Shubik (1973).
4which trade only a limited set of goods and which are costly to run. Because of the problem of the
double coincidence of wants, barter exchange fails to emerge in equilibrium: in essence, the ￿ ow of
trade is too small to cover the costs of running the trading facility. Since monetary exchange requires
only a single coincidence, the ￿ ow of trade can cover the shop￿ s operating costs ￿ under circumstances
in which barter would be infeasible. Like Howitt, we assume that each trading facility can trade only
a limited set of commodities. As Howitt (2005, p.409) has stressed, ￿Such a limitation is empirically
plausible, given the casual observation that no retail outlet (even Walmart) in any economy of record
trades more than a small fraction of tradeable objects.￿Moreover, while Howitt￿ s model captures
shopping at the canonical shoe store (where, depending upon proclivities an individual may purchase
n ￿ 0 pairs of shoes), our model captures shopping at a department or grocery store (in which
consumers purchase baskets of di⁄erentiated goods). In contrast to Howitt, however, in the interests
of simplicity we do not model the endogenous formation of trading posts. This allows us to pursue
our primary focus, which is elucidating the links between the means of factor payments and the
exchange of ￿nal goods and services.
Finally, this paper builds upon Laing, Li, and Wang (2007). The principle similarity is that this
paper also invokes a monopolistically competitive multiple-matching trading environment to study
trade frictions. Nevertheless, in Laing et al. (2007) we ruled out barter a priori (via a Wicksellian
preference structure). As a consequence, that paper addresses none of the issues that are central to
this one.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t 2 N: The commodity space, ￿0 = [0;N] ￿ R+, consists of
a continuum of distinct varieties of goods, indexed by !, which are arranged around a circle with
circumference N. The economy is populated by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households, indexed
by h 2 H0 ￿ [0;H], and a continuum of in￿nitely lived owners, indexed by ^ h 2 ^ H0 = [0;N].
(Throughout, we use the circum￿ ex ￿ ^￿to distinguish between owners from households.) Although
they discount the future at the common rate ￿ 2 (0;1), the two groups of agents di⁄er in their
endowments and preferences. Speci￿cally, each household possesses an indivisible unit of labor that
is supplied inelastically to at most one ￿rm at a time, while each owner both owns and controls a ￿rm
that has unique access to the technology used to produce one type of the di⁄erentiated commodities
! 2 ￿0.7 We assume that the set of ￿rms in the economy is exogenously given.8 We denote measures
7As in Diamond and Yellin (1990), this structure allows us to avoid explicitly modelling an equity market or the
Arrow-Debreu redistribution of ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Incorporating this feature into a barter environment is problematic, since
dividend payments are in the form of goods. The current ownership structure avoids this problem; puts barter and
monetary exchange on the same footing; and allows a precise characterization of the di¢ culties of the former relative
to the latter grounded in tastes (the problem of the double coincidence) and trade frictions.
8None of the arguments presented in this paper depend upon the ￿xed-entry assumption.
5by ￿[￿]; and make the following normalizations: ￿[ ^ H0] = ￿[H0] = N = H = 1. To avoid the di¢ culty
that agents/goods in two arbitrary intervals of di⁄erent lengths can be fully matched, we assume
throughout that any household-￿rm or household-good matches are measure-preserving.
2.1 Preferences
In order to capture the problem of the double coincidence of wants, we assume that agents possess
idiosyncratic preferences. More speci￿cally, a given household, h, derives utility only by consuming
goods that belong to an idiosyncratic interval ￿(h). Each household draws its particular interval,
independently, and at random from ￿0, at the beginning of each period. Although all of such intervals,
￿(h) (h 2 H0), are of equal length, we assume that their locations are uniformly distributed on the
commodity circle. We assume that owners￿preferences are essentially the same as households. That
is, they derive utility by consuming goods and services that belong to idiosyncratic intervals ^ ￿(^ h)
(^ h 2 ^ H0), which are drawn independently and at random from ￿0 at the beginning of each period
and have the same length as ￿(h).
De￿ne the degree of ￿specialization￿in tastes by x ￿ ￿[^ ￿] = ￿[￿] 2 [0;1]. In a given meeting
between two agents endowed with distinct goods ! and !0, the probabilities of a single coincidence
of wants and the double coincidence of wants are x and x2 respectively. Assumption 1 describes
formally the identical felicity function of households and the identical felicity function of owners.
Assumption 1. (Preferences)
(a) Household h￿ s felicity function is given by U (D(h)t), where U(￿) is strictly increasing and strictly
concave, satisfying the boundary conditions U(0) = 0 and limd!1 U(D) = ￿ u << 1 and where the











where ￿ > 1 and c(!)t is the date t consumption of good !:
(b) The felicity function of owner ^ h who produces good !(^ h) is linear in the consumption aggregator,
^ D(^ h)t = b C(!(^ h))t +
Z
^ ￿(^ h)nf!(^ h)g
^ c(u;!(^ h))t du; (2)
where (upper case) b C(!) is owner ^ h￿ s consumption of his own-produced good !(^ h); and (lower-case)
^ c(u;!(^ h)) is his consumption of some other good u 2 ^ ￿(^ h) n f!(^ h)g.
In equation (1), U (D) is the periodic utility a household derives by consuming the ￿basket￿ of
goods D(h)t. The concavity assumption is standard; the asymptotic upper bound ￿ u ￿as explained
later ￿ensures the convergence in the limit, as search frictions vanish, of welfare under both barter
and monetary exchange. Observe from (1) that the value obtained from any given basket of goods
6depends upon the variety of commodities contained therein [see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)]. The
parameter ￿ is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between goods. To ensure the existence
of a well-de￿ned monopolistically-competitive pricing game we impose ￿ > 1, implying that goods
are substitutes. Finally, in (2) we restrict the owner￿ s periodic utility to be linear in ^ D.9
2.2 Technology
In the monopolistically competitive environment considered in this paper, each owner ^ h owns a
single ￿rm, and each ￿rm produces a unique product ! 2 ￿0. Hence it is both possible to ease the
notational burden by identifying each owner, ^ h, with his unique product !. Although ￿rms produce
di⁄erentiated commodities, we assume they possess identical technologies in the sense that, for the
same quantity of labor input, they produce the same quantity of output of their particular product
variety. The force of this assumption is that ￿rms are economically symmetric ex ante. Formally,
for each owner ^ h, denote ‘(^ h) 2 R+ as the owner￿ s employment level, y(!(^ h)) 2 R+ as the level of
output of good !(^ h), and the production technology as F(‘(^ h);^ h). Then we have:
Assumption 2. (Technology)
(a) At each point in time t, each ￿rm owner ^ h has access to an identical technology given by,
y(!(^ h)) = F(‘(^ h);^ h) = f(‘); (3)
where f(‘) represents the quantity of each good produced with labor input ‘ and is strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave, satisfying the following boundary and Inada conditions, f(0) = 0 and
lim‘!0 f0(‘) = 1:
(b) Households are equally talented at producing any of the di⁄erentiated commodities.
(c) Firms and households can costlessly store any amount of their own production good. Neither of
them possesses the technology required to store any other good. Goods stored in inventory depreciate
at the common rate ￿ 2 [0;1].
According to part (a), each ￿rm produces its output using a standard concave technology. Notice
that, in part (b), it is immaterial whether or not a worker accepts employment at a ￿rm that produces
a good in his consumption set. By virtue of the integral used to de￿ne the household￿ s preferences
[equation (1)] the contribution to utility from any such source is precisely zero. The twin assumptions
in part (c) that agents can store their production good (in any amount), and only their production
good are important. The former, by minimizing the signi￿cance of money as a store of value, enables
us to focus on its role as a medium of exchange. The latter feature precludes the emergence of
9This restriction eliminates wealth e⁄ects on each owner￿ s price-setting behavior. It is innocuous given our focus on
ex post symmetric equilibrium.
7commodity monies, which would complicate the analysis considerably.10
Consider a household h who is employed by a ￿rm that produces good !, at the beginning of
period t. In what follows, we denote this household￿ s initial inventory holdings of good ! by k(!;h)t.
Since we have already identi￿ed the owner of the ￿rm with its unique product, !; the ￿rm￿ s initial
inventory holdings are simply denoted by ^ k(!)t.11
2.3 Markets, Prices, and Contracts
There are three markets of interest: the labor market, the capital (loanable funds) market, and the
product market. We assume the labor market is competitive: ￿rms can hire labor provided their
contractual o⁄er (see below) provides workers with a lifetime utility of at least V0 (determined in a
market for labor contracts). The competitive labor market is warranted by the assumed free mobility
of labor, and the assumption that households are equally talented at producing any good !.12 In
order to focus on the role of money as a medium of exchange, throughout we assume that neither
￿rms nor workers have access to capital markets.13 Finally, we assume that the product market is
monopolistically competitive, and is subject to trade frictions. In the remainder of this subsection
we describe the labor contracts o⁄ered by ￿rms; the prices they post; and the nature of the frictions
that inhere in the product market.
Owners make all of the hiring, production, and pricing decisions relevant to the ￿rm they control.
Thus, in any given period, each owner, ! 2 ￿0 hires ‘(!) workers, by o⁄ering a labor contract
￿(!)t = (W(!)t;s(!)t), where W(!)t > 0, is a monetary wage, and s(!)t > 0; is a payment made
in terms of the ￿rm￿ s output. As we shall see later, these labor contracts forge the link between
equilibrium factor payments and the endogenous medium of exchange.
The owner of each ￿rm also posts prices Q(!)t = (P(!)t;fr(!;!0)tg!02￿0nf!g ); where (i) P(!)t,
10Rather than simply assuming that agents cannot store goods they do not produce themselves, as is done here, we
can derive this from ￿rst principles [as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)]. To do so we would simply posit a small but
positive transactions cost. In this case, given the symmetry of all goods, agents would not accept commodity monies
when they can always barter their own production good (and avoid the cost).
11Recall that part (c) of Assumption 2 restricts inventory holding and hence there is no need for using a more general
notation for storing other goods.
12As is standard in (optimal) contracting environments, only the distribution of utility between workers and ￿rms
depends upon the competitive-labor-market assumption and not the (essential) properties of the contract. Thus, if V0
is determined in either a monopsonistic labor market ￿ or even one characterized by search frictions ￿ then ￿rms
must simply o⁄er contracts, ￿, that provide at least this reservation utility.
13This implies that ￿rms must use beginning of period cash balances and/or inventory holdings to ￿nance the ￿rm￿ s
contractual obligations. Likewise, households can procure goods only using their current income and/or any savings
they carried over from the previous period. The assumption that the ￿rm cannot use current output to ￿nance goods￿
payments to workers is inconsequential.
8is the (date-t) monetary price of the ￿rm￿ s product and (ii) fr(!;!0)tg!02￿0nf!g are its (date-t)
relative (goods-for-goods) prices.14 These relative prices determine its willingness to exchange its
own good ! for goods !0 brought to it by other traders; the measurement units are units of !0 per
unit !: Intuitively, r(!;!0) equals the number of units of !0 that ￿rm ! must receive in order to
exchange a unit of !. Under this convention it is then immediate that 1=r(!; !0)t is again the relative
price posted by ￿rm ! ￿this time measured in units of ! per unit of !0. Notice that, r(!0; !)t is the
relative price posted by ￿rm !0 for good !, measured in units of ! per unit !0. In a monopolistically
competitive environment, the relative goods-for-goods prices posted by two di⁄erent sellers for two
identical goods may (and generally will) di⁄er. Heuristically, the apple producer might set a price of
two bananas per apple, at the same time the banana producer sets a price of two apples per banana:
i.e., there is no presumption that 1=r(!;!0)t = r(!0; !)t.
Later, we will see that a convenient feature of the symmetric properties of the model is that all
relative prices take the simple form r(!;!0)t 2 f0;rg, for each ￿rm ! and for each good !0:
We assume that the product market is characterized by signi￿cant trading frictions. Assumption
3 describes the matching process in this market,
Assumption 3. (The Product Market)
(a) Matching takes place only between households and ￿rms.
(b) During each period, each household is randomly matched with a subset of ￿rms, Z(h)0 ￿ ￿0,
with measure
￿(Z(h)0) = ￿ 2 (0;1]: (4)
(c) Anonymity.
Part (a) rules out direct house-to-household and ￿rm-to-￿rm exchanges, which simpli￿es admissible
steady-state exchange patterns. This pattern of exchange can be justi￿ed (at the cost of additional
notation) as an endogenous outcome given more primitive assumptions on individual preferences and
worker skills. We show this formally in Appendix A.
In part (b), each household matches with a continuum of ￿rms of measure ￿.15 The parameter
14Since each producer manafactures a single variety, it is possible to utilize the simple notation used in this text.




could write relative prices as R : ￿
3 ￿ N ! R+, where R(!;!
0;!
00)t ￿ 0 would be the date-t relative price that ￿rm
! posts for exchanging good !
0 and receiving good !
00. Yet, in view of that fact that the ￿rm produces only one good
we have ! ￿ !
0. Consequently, it would be overly pedantic to deny ourselves the use of the simple notation presented
in the text.
15The assumption that each household matches with a mass of traders is made for technical convenience. More
speci￿cally, it (i) eliminates idiosyncratic consumption risk (by virtue of the law of large numbers), (ii) ensures that
periodic utility is both positive and ￿nite (i.e., utility may be written as an integral over a set with positive measure),
(iii) provides a natural parameterization of market frictions (in terms of the measure, ￿, of agents contacted each
9captures the extent of search frictions in the underlying environment (a frictionless economy is conse-
quently one in which ￿ = 1). As an alternative to randomness in the shopping process ￿ < 1 can also
be interpreted as a measure of spatial friction; while the location of desired goods are known, shoppers
can only visit a subset of those shops in a given period.16 Whenever a household meets a ￿rm, then
(as an identity) a ￿rm must also meet a household. Given our earlier population normalizations, ￿
is also the fraction of households that each ￿rm contacts during the period. Under suitable random
matching assumptions, ￿x is the measure of contacts that satisfy the single coincidence of wants
(from either the perspective of households or ￿rms).17 This gives ￿x2 as the measure of contacts
that satisfy the more stringent double coincidence of wants condition. Although agents may meet
many times, the anonymity assumption in part (c) implies the lack of an appropriate record-keeping
technology, which rules out the emergence of informal credit arrangements.18 Notice that commodity
money is ruled out via part (c) of Assumption 3.19
Remark. As in Shi (1997), and more recently as in Lagos and Wright (2005), the formulation of the
matching technology is designed to eliminate idiosyncratic household risk.20 A rigorous formulation
of the matching protocol in our model is as follows. While parts (a) and (c) of Assumption 3 remain
unchanged, part (b) can be decomposed in the following manner:
(b1) Each time period is of a unit length. Firms can change prices between periods but not within.
(b2) During a time of length dt > 0, each household sequentially meets ￿x ￿ dt sellers that procure a
good he or she desires.
(b3) The household and ￿rm immediately consume goods procured during the trading process.21
(b4) Take dt ! 0 in the limit.
Together parts (b1)-(b4) imply that the household￿ s periodic utility function (which is derived by
integrating across the period) is given by equation (19b). [Similar remarks apply to the owner of the
period), and, (iv) ensures that each ￿rm is negligible (in the sense that its pricing and employment strategies have no
e⁄ect upon aggregate consumer wealth). Those interested in understanding how one may approximate this continuum
economy by a ￿nite economy is referred to Hart (1985).
16Even more generally, we could model the determination of ￿ by considering active retailers who choose the optimal
scope of the varieties they o⁄er at each marketplace. The simplest model is to assume a constant retail markup together
with a strictly convex organizational cost over the scope of products o⁄ered for sale. This structure will pin down a
unique interior solution for ￿. We do not, however, do so as this would take us too far a￿eld from our current interests.
17See, for example, Carlos Al￿s-Ferrer (1999).
18The importance and the role of this ubiquitous assumption is explored in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1989).
19Also, as observed in footnote 10, it is entirely possible (with a modest emendation of the environment) to derive
this as an equilibrium result.
20In Shi, the household comprises a continuum of members. In Lagos and Wright, the household consists of a single
member who ￿meets￿a continuum of other traders while trading on the competitive ￿ day￿market.
21Note that in view of Assumption 2(c), there is no storage and hence goods procured at one point in time during
the trading process will not be used as commodity money and will not be subsequently traded at another point.
10￿rm whose utility is given by (19c).]
The intuition we intend to capture via Assumption 3 is disarmingly simple. Think of a consumer
who does his week￿ s shopping at a local market or bazaar during a period of time of unit length.
While at the market we view the household as, in essence, having time to match with the sellers of
many products (but not every product in the economy), and for realism conceive of him selectively
purchasing a basket of commodities (but not every good o⁄ered for sale). The ￿ large numbers￿
assumption is intended to capture the notion that, although the consumer may be uncertain about
the speci￿c group of goods o⁄ered for sale that week, he anticipates ￿ almost surely￿the nature of
his end-of-period shopping experience (and the utility he will obtain as a result).22 The force of
this Assumption is that almost every household perceives a fully deterministic planning environment
during each period. In order to study both barter and monetary exchange we assume that each
market stall posts both monetary and goods for goods prices, and allow households to ￿nance their
purchases using cash and/or goods.
2.4 Matching
Both households and ￿rms desire only those goods that belong to their respective consumption sets
￿(h) and ^ ￿(!). Consequently, not every match described in Assumption 3 can result in bene￿cial
exchange. In this subsection we describe those that do (and as a corollary, those that do not).
According to Assumption 3, at the beginning of each period, household h 2 H matches with a
set of ￿rms Z(h)0;with measure ￿[Z(h)0] = ￿. In what follows, we will have frequent recourse to
consider the following subset of them: Z(h) ￿ f! 2 Z(h)0 : ! 2 ￿(h)g ￿ Z(h)0. It consists of those
matches that also belong to the given household￿ s consumption set, ￿(h).
It is convenient to further partition the set Z into two subsets Zb, and Zm, which represent,
respectively, those matches that satisfy the double coincidence of wants, and those that satisfy the
household￿ s (but not the owner￿ s) single coincidence of wants.23 The signi￿cance of this distinction
is that the household can ￿nance its purchases of goods belonging to the set Zb using a mixture of
cash and goods. However, it is obliged to use money for matches that belong to the set Zm, as they
do not satisfy the double coincidence of wants. Finally, we denote the complementary set of matches
that provide the household with no utility whatsoever by Zn. It is easily checked that the respective
measures of these sets are ￿[Z] = ￿x; ￿[Zb] = ￿x2; ￿[Zm] = ￿x(1 ￿ x); and ￿[Zn] = ￿(1 ￿ x):
Similar concepts can be de￿ned from the perspective of each of the ￿rms that populate the
economy ￿ with a slight twist. The owner of a given ￿rm, !; is not interested in the identities of the
22As is common in the monopolistic-competition literature we assume that although prices are fully ￿ exible across
periods, they are constant within them. In the present context this means that the prices the consumer faces at each
stall are independent of the order in which he or she executes his or her shopping plan.
23When discussing a prototypical household we suppress the index h in order to ease the notational burden.
11households it matches with per se; instead she is interested in the particular goods that they bring
to market ￿in particular those that belong to her own consumption set ^ ￿(!): Analogously to the
case of households described above, de￿ne ^ Z(!)0 ￿ H as the set of households that match with ￿rm
! during the period, and de￿ne ^ Z(!) to be the subset of them who have a product that the owner of
￿rm ! desires. Just as was the case for households, the set ^ Z(!) can be further partitioned into two
subsets: ^ Z(!)b and ^ Z(!)m. The former includes those matches that satisfy the double-coincidence
of wants; the latter matches that satisfy the household￿ s (but not the ￿rm￿ s) single coincidence of
wants.24 Finally, ^ Z(!)n denotes the set of households who bring with them to market a product
that ￿rm ! does not value. Given a level of employment per ￿rm of L then, according to Assumption
3, each ￿rm matches with a set of employed consumers with measure ￿[ ^ Z0] = ￿L:25 The measures
of the other sets are ￿[ ^ Z] = ￿xL; ￿[ ^ Zb] = ￿x2L, ￿[ ^ Zm] = ￿x(1 ￿ x)L, and ￿[ ^ Zn] = ￿L(1 ￿ x):
2.5 Fiat Money
The aggregate stock of ￿at money, at the beginning of time t, is Mt. Fiat money is not intrinsically
valued by any agent; it cannot be privately produced (think of paper currency for example); and it








where M(h)t and ^ M(!)t are, respectively, household h0s and owner !0s nominal cash holdings. We
assume that the money supply grows over time as a consequence of a lump-sum injection, Tt, from
the monetary authority, that is given to ￿rms each period.26 The stock of money evolves in the
following manner:
Mt+1 = Mt + Tt = (1 + ￿)Mt; (6)
where ￿ ￿ 0 is the constant rate of monetary growth. Given the constant rate of monetary growth
￿, we set zt ￿ (1 + ￿)t and use zt to transform all of the nominal variables. Accordingly, let
m(h)t ￿ M(h)t=zt, ^ m(!)t ￿ ^ M(!)t=zt, wt ￿ Wt=zt, and pt ￿ Pt=zt:
24The trade structure is one in which households purchase goods from ￿rms. (It is a property of the symmetric
equilibrium considered in this paper that no ￿rm can gain by o⁄ering to purchase goods from consumers for cash. )
25In equilibrium everyone is employed, implying L = 1: As is appropriate, we ￿rst develop the properties of the
model for any L > 0 and establish a ￿xed point around L = 1 in the ￿nal step when we establsih the existence of an
equilibrium.
26Modeling cash injections to ￿rms who use it to ￿nance wage payments is fairly standard in the monetary business
cycle literature (e.g., Fuerst (1992)). This is without loss of generality as we could equally well assume that, as in
for example Casella and Feinstein (1990), the cash injection is received by households (￿ buyer￿ s￿ ) rather than ￿rms
(￿ sellers￿ ).
12Finally, we de￿ne q(!)t = (p(!)t;fr(!;!0)tg!02￿0nf!g), as the vector of monetary, and goods-
for-goods prices posted by the ￿rm. In what follows we shall have recourse to consider only these
transformed variables.
2.6 Time Sequence
The sequence of events, during any given period t, is described below. In stage I each household
and ￿rm begins the period with inventory holdings k(!;h)t and ^ k(!)t and money holdings M(h)t
and ^ M(!)t respectively. The idiosyncratic preference shock is then realized, and both households
and owners learn the respective intervals ￿(h) and ^ ￿(!) over which their preferences are de￿ned
for that period. In stage II the owner of each ￿rm ! 2 ￿0 (i) o⁄ers ‘(!) workers the contract
￿(!) = fw(!);s(!)g and (ii) posts the prices q(!). After ￿rms make their hiring commitments for
the period, production commences and the terms of the contract are executed (stage III). In stage
IV matching takes place and trading occurs. In stage V, ￿rms receive the monetary transfer, T, from
the government. Finally, in stage VI, each agent chooses a consumption and savings plan.
2.7 The Equilibrium Concept
In what follows we focus on stationary-symmetric Nash equilibria, in which (given each household￿ s
optimal behavior) each ￿rm￿ s choices of employment, ‘; the contract, ￿, and its prices q are optimal
given the perceived behavior of other ￿rms. Each ￿rm is negligible in the continuum and treats
as exogenous the worker reservation utility V0 and the prices posted by other ￿rms. Households
optimally supply their labor on the basis of the contractual o⁄ers made by ￿rms and take as given
the prices set by ￿rms. However, each ￿rm is fully cognizant of the fact that households have met
many other sellers and that they will substitute toward other commodities if the price it sets is
unfavorable to them.
Our ultimate goal is to solve for the model￿ s steady-state symmetric Nash equilibria, which we
do in three steps. We ￿rst characterize each household￿ s demand functions for the di⁄erentiated
products in their consumption baskets for a given price distribution. Next, we determine each ￿rm￿ s
best response function around any given (stationary) symmetric price con￿guration. The third and
￿nal step uses these households￿demand schedules and ￿rms￿best response functions to derive the
model￿ s Nash equilibria. Generally, this third step would involve solving for the ￿xed point in the
functional space of the price distribution. However, under our symmetry assumption, this step
becomes trivial as it is nothing but a simple guess-and-verify exercise. That is, we guess a symmetric
price con￿guration (a single point price distribution) and verify it as a Nash equilibrium price posting
by all ￿rms. The reader should note that while we will verify the existence of steady-state symmetric
Nash equilibria, steady-state asymmetric Nash equilibria may (and generally will) exist; however,
examining the properties of such equilibria extends well beyond the ambit of this paper.
133 Household Behavior
We now examine the behavior of an arbitrary household h 2 H endowed with kt = k(!0;h)t of good
!0; and with money holdings mt = m(h)t. We study the household￿ s behavior within a stationary
environment in which (i) the household is o⁄ered the stationary labor contract, ￿t = ￿ = (w; s) 8t;
and (ii) each ￿rm ! 2 ￿0 posts the stationary prices q(!) ￿ (p(!); r(!; !0)!02￿0nf!g) 8t.27
Recall from subsection 2.4 that Z0 denotes the set of goods that a given household h encounters
during the matching process, and that Z = Zm [ Zb denotes the subset of them that provide it with
positive utility. In order to solve the household￿ s problem, it is helpful to decompose the procurement
of each good in the barter set, ! 2 Zb; according to its means of ￿nancing. Thus de￿ne,
c(!) ￿ c(!)b + c(!)m; for all ! 2 Zb; (7)
where c(!)b is that part of c(!) ￿nanced using goods￿payments and c(!)m is that part ￿nanced with
money. (Note that c(!)b = 0 for all ! 2 Zm as households must use cash for meetings that do not
satisfy the double coincidence of wants.) A household that is paid in kind with the particular good
!0 solves the following program:
V (k;m) = max
cb;cm
[U(D) + ￿V (k+1;m+1)] (8a)
s:t: k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿






(1 + ￿)m+1 =
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Equation (7), c ￿ 0 ;cb ￿ 0; and c ￿ cb ￿ 0:
where V is the household￿ s value function, k ￿ k(!0;h)t; k+1 ￿ k(!0;h)t+1;m+1 ￿ mt+1 and D is the
CES valuation of goods in the set Z (see equation 1). To simplify the notation all current time period
subscripts are suppressed. Condition (8a) is the consumer￿ s objective function and (8b) describes
the evolution of the household￿ s inventory of goods. The household augments its current inventory
holdings, k, through its (in kind) goods￿income s and depletes them through bartering with ￿rms for
goods that belong to the set Zb. Analogously equation (8c) is the law of motion for the household￿ s
accumulated money balances.
Lemma 1 describes the household￿ s optimal inventory holdings of cash, mt, and goods, kt.
Lemma 1. (Household Behavior)
Each consumer￿ s optimal behavior is described by,
k = m = 0 8t: (9)
27Recall the transformations: wt ￿ Wt=zt and pt ￿ Pt=zt. In view of this, the stationary environment is one in
which the nominal wage, W, and the price level, P; grow at the common rate ￿.
14Proof. All proofs are presented in Appendix B.
The environment confronting each household is stationary and non-stochastic, implying the absence of
a precautionary saving￿ s motive. With positive discounting, consumers optimally set their inventory,
k, and cash, m, holdings to zero in steady state [equation (9)].
The zero holding of inventory and cash across periods simpli￿es the analysis greatly ￿the dy-
namic optimization and intertemporal consumption demand become generically static. As shown in
Appendix B, a household￿ s consumption demand for good !, procured via barter by trading good
!0, can be speci￿ed as:








; ! 2 Zb: (10)
where the denominator is the monopolistically competitive price index. Similarly, a household￿ s
consumption demand for good ! purchased with cash is given by,








; ! 2 Zm: (11)
In each case, the constants of proportionality depend upon the consumer￿ s contract ￿ = (w;s);
and upon the integral of each pricing pro￿le r(!;!0) and p(!) [suitably de￿ned over those matches
whose goods provide the household with positive utility Z(h)].
However, in what follows, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which ￿rms a.e. post identical
monetary and relative goods-for-goods prices.28 As described below, this emphasis leads to very
simple household demand functions. To see this, consider a generic ￿rm ! that posts the prices
q = (p;r), where (i) p = p(!) is its monetary price, and (ii) r = r(!;!0) ￿ 0 for !0 2 ^ Z(!)b
(and r = 0 otherwise) are its relative goods-for-goods prices.29 Suppose further that a.e. the other
monopolistically competitive ￿rms, u 2 ￿0 n f!g, post the common prices q = q(u) ￿ (p;r) where
(i) p = p(u) is their common monetary price, and (ii) r = r(u;!0) ￿ 0 for !0 2 ^ Z(u)b (and zero
otherwise) are their common relative goods-for goods prices. Consider,
Lemma 2. (Consumers￿ demand functions) Consider some household h with current desirable
matches Z = Zm [ Zb, and a given ￿rm ! that posts prices q(!) when the other ￿rms u 2 ￿0 n f!g
post a.e. the common prices q. Then,
(a) For all u 62 Z the consumer￿ s demand is c(u) = c(u)b = 0:
(b) for all u 2 Z n f!g the consumer￿ s demand is
(b1) If (w=p) > [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r) then ,
c(!) = (1=￿x)[(w=p) + (s=r)]: (12)
28A similar approach is adopted in Behrens and Merata (2007) in a monopolistically competitive environment with a
continuum of goods, although their study does not consider frictional matching nor money/goods inventory holdings.
29Recall that barter is pertinent only for goods that belong to the owner￿ s double-coincidence set ^ Z(!)b:
15(b2) If w=p < [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r) then,
c(!) = c(!)b = (1=￿x2)(s=r); 8! 2 Zb (13a)
c(!) = c(!)m = (1=￿x(1 ￿ x))(w=p); 8! 2 Zm: (13b)
(c) De￿ne ^ ￿ ￿ [((1 ￿ x)=x)(r=s)(w=p))]￿. If ! 2 Z then optimizing consumer behavior is described
by,





















where ￿a = 1 if ! 2 Zb and r ￿ (p=p)r; otherwise ￿a = 0.





















where ￿b = 1 if ! 2 Zb and r ￿ ^ ￿(p=p)r; otherwise ￿b = 0:
(c3) (Financing) If s > 0, then,
c(!;q;q)b =
8
> > > <






> > > <
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= [￿c + (1 ￿ ￿c)^ ￿](p=p)r
>
; (16)
where ￿c = 1 if w=p ￿ [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r) and ￿c = 0 otherwise.
Part (a) is trivial: the household desires only those goods that belong to its consumption set
￿(h) and can purchase only from those ￿rms that it matches with during the period: Z(h)0. That
is, it neither purchases goods it does not want nor those that it cannot.
Part (b) is explained as follows. Ideally, consumers seek uniform consumption levels of each of the
di⁄erentiated products belonging to Z nf!g, as each of them enters symmetrically into their strictly
concave utility functions. However, because of trade frictions this might not always be possible ￿an
observation that is the key to the distinction between cases (b1) and (b2) in the Lemma. For instance
in part (b2), the consumer has a relative abundance of goods he can trade: s=r > [x=(1 ￿ x)](w=p).
Under these circumstances, equations (13a) and (13b) imply that for any pair of goods !1 2 Zb and
!2 2 Zm,
c(!1) = (1=￿x2)(s=r) > c(!2) = [1=￿x(1 ￿ x)](w=p):
This inequality illustrates how the problem of the double coincidence of wants distorts the household￿ s
consumption levels (relative to a world without trade frictions). More speci￿cally, it impedes the
household from using his real good￿ s income, s=r; to obtain uniform levels of consumption, by a⁄ecting
a simultaneous reduction in c(!1) and increase in c(!2).
16In contrast, uniform consumption levels are feasible ￿ and indeed chosen ￿ in case b1. Here,
the household is abundant with cash as w=p > [(1￿x)=x](s=r). The Lemma shows that under these
circumstances c(!1) = c(!2) = f(w=p)+(s=r)g=(￿x) for !1 2 Zb and !2 2 Zm, which indicates that
the consumer simply uniformly spreads out his (periodic) real income f(w=p) + (s=r)g across all of
the matches that provide him with positive utility.
The demand functions presented in part (c) of the Lemma essentially take standard constant
elasticity forms. Speci￿c instances are readily recovered. For instance, in case (c1) the household
has a relative surfeit of cash as (w=p) ￿ [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r). Suppose that ! 2 Zb and that the terms
of goods-for-goods trading are ￿favorable￿￿in the sense that r < (p=p)r ￿then according to the
Lemma ￿a = 1, implying,
c(!) = c(!)b = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(r=r)￿:
Hence, under these circumstances, the consumer ￿nances its purchases of ! through barter alone.
Notice that the pertinent price is the relative barter trading price (r=r). Alternatively, if r > (p=p)r
then according to the Lemma, ￿a = 0, thus leading to,
c(!) = c(!)m = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(p=p)￿:
Hence, in this case, the household ￿nances its purchases of ! using cash exclusively and the relative
monetary price (p=p) is the relevant one.
A similar interpretation holds for case (c2) in which the household has an abundant supply of
tradable goods relative to his cash holdings: [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r) > w=p. Notice from its de￿nition that
under these circumstances that ^ ￿ > 1. It follows from equation (16) that the terms of monetary
trade must be relatively attractive ￿i.e., p=p must be ￿low￿￿ before a cash-poor household would
￿nance its purchases of a good that belongs to the barter set Zb exclusively using money.
4 Pure Barter Exchange
In the pure barter equilibrium (PBE) all trade involves the exchange of goods for goods, and money
is not valued. Each period, workers receive their remuneration in terms of their employers output
alone and, upon payment, search for trading partners. In order to establish the existence of a steady-
state symmetric Nash equilibrium, our analysis proceeds as follows. We ￿rst assume that money is
valueless and derive each seller￿ s best-response given (i) the consumer demand functions in Lemma 2,
and (ii) both the prices and labor contracts o⁄ered by other ￿rms. We then solve for the symmetric
steady-state full-employment PBE and ￿nally check that no agent optimally accepts cash, which, in
this case, is trivial.
174.1 Firm￿ s Behavior
We determine the best response behavior of an arbitrary ￿rm, indexed !, conditional on the demands
presented in Lemma 2 given values of q = (1;r) and v = (0;s) o⁄ered by other ￿rms, and a given
level of employment per ￿rm L (assuming that money is valueless).30
As noted in subsection 2.4, ￿rm ! matches with a set ^ Z0 of employed customers, where ￿[ ^ Z0] =
￿L. The owner of ￿rm ! maximizes her lifetime utility ^ V ,
^ V (^ k) = max
f ^ C:‘;s;rg
[ ^ C + Lx2rc(!;q;q)] + ￿ ^ V (^ k+1) (17a)
s:t: ^ k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿x2Lc(!;q;q) ￿ ^ C] (17b)
(s ￿ s)‘ > 0 (17c)
^ k > s‘ (17d)
where ^ k+1 ￿ ^ k(!)t+1; ^ k = k(!)t, and both current time subscripts and the argument ! are suppressed.
As a consequence of symmetry, the ￿rm￿ s relative price is r = r(!;!00) for !00 2 ^ Zb and r = 0
otherwise.
In (17a) the owner of ￿rm ! derives utility by consuming her own product ( ^ C) in conjunction
with goods in ^ Zb acquired after bartering with households.31 Equation (17b) describes the evolution
of the owner￿ s inventory holdings; any output not used to pay workers is either consumed by the
owner, sold to households, or is stored for the future. Condition (17c) is the worker￿ s participation
constraint. The ￿rm must o⁄er a good￿ s payment of at least s to be accepted by workers. The
inequality (17d) re￿ ects the absence of capital markets: all payments to workers are ￿nanced from





the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition (with respect to ^ k) are
^ c[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ Vk] = 0 with 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ Vk ￿ 0; ^ c > 0 (18a)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0 = s ( = s) (18b)
￿^ Vk + ’ = 0 (18c)
￿Lx2c(!;q;q)[￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ V =r ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)] = 0 (18d)
(^ Vk)+1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ Vk + ￿b: (18e)
30As is appropriate, we distinguish the ex ante per-￿rm employment level L from its ex post full-employment equi-
librium value l
￿ = L = 1:
31Goods ! and !
00 are exchanged only if the double coincidence of wants is satis￿ed (i.e., only if !
00 2 ^ Zb). In














2L: The ￿rst equality follows from the identity
that income equals expenditure: c(!
00) = r(!;!
00)c(!). The second follows from symmetry (r = r(!;!
00) for all ! 2 ^ Zb
) and the third from the law of large numbers, ￿[ ^ Zb] = ￿x
2L.
18where ^ Vk ￿ d^ V (k)t=dkt;f0 ￿ df(‘)=d‘, and ’ and ￿b are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints
(17c) and (17d), respectively. The complementary slackness condition (18a) re￿ ects the possibility
that the ￿rm might, after paying workers, optimally exchange all of its residual output with consumers
and set ^ C(!) = 0. Condition (18b) says the ￿rm hires workers up to the point at which the marginal
bene￿t of labor equals its marginal cost (all measured in terms of real output). The other conditions,
(18c), (18d) and (18e), possess similar routine interpretations.
4.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In a symmetric steady-state equilibrium with full-employment, the numbers of workers per ￿rm is
equalized (L = ‘ = 1), each ￿rm sets a common price (r = r = r￿), and all ￿rms o⁄er the same
payment to workers s = s = s￿. Also, in the PBE, cash is valueless (p￿ = 1 ), and money wages are
not paid to workers w￿ = 0.
In order to avoid the tedious duplication of results in the boundary case ^ C = 0, in which the
owner trades away all of her residual output, consider
Condition U. ￿ ￿ ￿=f￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)g:
Condition U ensures that owners discount the future su¢ ciently rapidly that it is optimal, at the
margin, for them to consume unsold output beyond that required to pay for next period￿ s labor. We
assume throughout that Condition U is satis￿ed.
Theorem 1. (Pure Barter Equilibrium: PBE)
Under Condition U a unique symmetric steady-state PBE exists. It is described by,
‘￿ = 1 (19a)
￿￿ = fw￿;s￿g; w￿ = 0 and s￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(1) (19b)
p￿ = 1 and r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) (19c)
^ C￿ = f(1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(1)[1 + (r￿=(1 ￿ ￿))]=r￿ > 0 (19d)
c￿ = (s￿=￿x2r￿) 8! 2 Zb and c(!)￿ = 0 otherwise (19e)
^ k￿ = s￿ and ^ m￿ 6 M0: (19f)
Equation (19b) says that workers are hired up to the point at which the value of their goods￿
payment,s￿, equals the net value of their marginal product (adjusted by (1￿￿)￿, re￿ ecting discounting
and the depreciation of inventory). Equation (19c) determines equilibrium pricing. The condition
r￿ = ￿=(￿￿1) is standard in models of monopolistic competition. It equals each consumer￿ s common
marginal rate of substitution between all goods in their consumption set. With p￿ = 1 , it is neither
optimal for workers to exchange their labor for money nor for ￿rms to trade their goods for money.
19Given symmetric pricing, each household uniformly allocates his periodic real income s￿=r￿ among
all commodities that satisfy the double coincidence of wants ! 2 Zb. From (19b) and (19c) real
income is,
(s￿=r￿) = [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿](1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(1): (20)
In (20) the term 1=r￿ = (￿￿1)=￿ < 1 is the wedge between workers￿real incomes and their (suitably)
discounted marginal product that arises by virtue of each ￿rm￿ s monopoly power. As ￿ ! 1
consumers regard all goods as close substitutes. In this case each ￿rm￿ s monopoly is minimal and
and both real incomes, s￿=r￿, and the relative prices, r￿, converge to their ￿ competitive￿ values
equations (19c) and (20)].
5 Monetary Exchange Under Steady-State In￿ ation
Although pure barter exchange is always an equilibrium, our model also admits monetary equilibria.
Two cases may be distinguished. First, in the pure monetary equilibrium (PME) cash is used on
one side of every transaction (goods and labor). Second, in the mixed trading equilibrium (MTE)
monetary exchange and barter coexist.32 Which one of these two exchange regimes pertains depends
crucially upon the parameter, ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿), which captures the comparative advantage of
barter relative to monetary exchange: barter is more attractive the lower is the rate of depreciation
of goods, ￿, and the higher is the rate of monetary growth ￿.
The basic strategy used to prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and to characterize
its properties, is essentially identical to that used for the PBE in Section 4. The main di⁄erence is
ruling out the possibility that in the PME, a ￿rm will ￿ defect￿from the proposed equilibrium and
o⁄er its employees a contract that includes both goods and cash payments, which workers optimally
accept. Unlike ￿at money, goods are intrinsically valuable.
5.1 Firm￿ s Behavior
We determine the best-response of an arbitrary ￿rm, indexed !, conditional upon the consumer
demand functions presented in Lemma 2; given values of v = (w;s) and q = (p;r) o⁄ered, a.e., by
other ￿rms, and a given level of aggregate employment per ￿rm of L.
With the lump sum cash transfer from the authorities, if the ￿rm employs ‘ workers at a wage
32The MTE considered here is quite distinct from the ￿mixed-monetary equilibrium￿(MME) analyzed by Kiyotaki
and Wright (1993). Indeed, the MME corresponds to a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which each agent is indi⁄erent
between accepting and rejecting money provided that among the population of agents it is accepted with a speci￿c
critical probability. As we explain below, the MTE is a pure-strategy equilibrium and it emerges only in speci￿c regions
of the parameter space.
20W; its cash balances evolve as,
^ Mt+1 = [ ^ Mt + ￿M0(1 + ￿)t +
Z
u2b Z
Ptcmtdu ￿ Wt‘t]; (21)
where ￿M0(1+￿)t is the nominal value of the periodic cash transfer and cmt is the (money ￿nanced)
demand for the ￿rm￿ s product, !, by household, u 2 ^ Z. [It is determined using the condition
c(!)m = c(!) ￿ c(!)b ￿see equation (7) ￿and Lemma 2.] The ￿rm augments its money holdings
through cash sales to consumers and depletes them through money wage payments to workers (W‘).
Using the transformations, ^ mt = ^ Mt=zt; pt = Pt=zt and wt = Wt=zt in conjunction with the measure
￿[ ^ Z] ￿ ￿xL, equation (21) becomes:
(1 + ￿)^ mt+1 = [ ^ Mt+1=zt+1](zt+1=zt) = ^ mt + ￿M0 + ￿Lxptcmt ￿ wt‘t: (22)
Given the evolution constraint, (22), and the measures ￿[ ^ Zb] and ￿[ ^ Zm], the owner of ￿rm ! solves:
^ V (^ k; ^ m) = max
f ^ C;‘;w;pg
[^ c + ￿Lx2rc(!2;q;q) + ￿ ^ V (^ k+1; ^ m+1)] (23a)
s:t: ^ m+1(1 + ￿) = [^ m + ￿M0 + ￿xLp[(1 ￿ x)c(!1;q;q) + xc(!2;q;q) ￿ w‘] (23b)
^ k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿xL[(1 ￿ x)c(!1;q;q) + xc(!2;q;q)] ￿ ^ c] (23c)
U[D] > (1 ￿ ￿)V0 (23d)
^ k > s‘ (23e)
^ m > w‘ (23f)
(s ￿ s)‘ > 0 (23g)
(w ￿ w)‘ > 0 (23h)
where !1 2 ^ Zm and !2 2 ^ Zb; ^ m+1 ￿ ^ m(!)t+1, ^ k+1 ￿ ^ k(!)t+1, ^ k ￿ ^ k(!)t, and the time subscript
is suppressed from ^ C;c;p;‘ and w. The possibility of barter implies that owners can derive utility by
consuming their own product, and from those goods they acquire after trading with households (23a).
Equation (23b) re-states the law of motion describing the evolution of the ￿rm￿ s money holdings.
Notice that in (23b) households in ^ Zb and ^ Zm may well ￿nance their purchases di⁄erently: members
of the former set may use cash and goods while members of the latter must use cash. In (23c) ￿
the participation constraint ￿U[D] is the periodic utility derived by the ￿rm￿ s employees from the
contract ￿, given that other ￿rms set, a.e., prices q = (p;r). 33
It is important to emphasize that inequality (23f) is an ex post ￿nance constraint, which arises
due to the absence of capital markets. Correctly interpreted it is not an ex post cash-in-advance




￿ + ￿x(1 ￿ x)c(!2)
1￿ 1
￿ g
￿=(￿￿q), where !1 2 ^ Zb and !2 2 ^ Zm:
21constraint (restricting both the means of payment and exchange). The reason is that ￿rms have the
option of paying workers in terms of their own output (which workers can use to barter for goods
with other ￿rms). The object of the present exercise is to circumscribe the conditions under which
this latter possibility either is or is not optimally exercised.
5.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In a symmetric steady-state full-employment equilibrium: employment per ￿rm is equalized (‘ =
L = ‘￿ = 1); each ￿rm sets a common price p = p = p￿; and all ￿rms o⁄er the same contract
￿ = ￿ = (w￿;s￿).
In addition, in the PME workers are not paid in goods, s = s = s￿ = 0, while in the MTE both
barter and monetary exchange coexist (w￿ > 0 and s￿ > 0). Theorem 2 establishes the existence of
monetary equilibria.
Theorem 2. (Monetary Equilibria)
Given condition U and denoting ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿). There is a stationary symmetric monetary
equilibrium a.e.,
(A) If ￿ < 1, it is a PME characterized by, w￿ > 0 and s￿ = 0,
(B) If ￿ > 1, it is a MTE characterized by, w￿ > 0 and s￿ > 0.
(C) If ￿ = 1, there is a unique PME.
Once again Condition U ensures that ^ C > 0 in either regime. In part (A) the condition that ￿ < 1
implies the comparative advantage of monetary exchange relative to barter. Here, the rate of in￿ ation
is not so high that ￿rms optimally o⁄er their employees both cash and goods payments. However,
this is not so in (B), as ￿ > 1 and, as a consequence, s￿ > 0. In the knife-edge case ￿ = 1,
neither monetary exchange nor barter has a comparative advantage. Accordingly, ￿rms and workers
are indi⁄erent to any contract ￿ = (w;s), o⁄ering workers (equilibrium) utility V*, provided that
w > p￿[(1￿x)=x](s=r￿). The reason is that, under these circumstances, (i) households secure uniform
consumption levels of all goods in their consumption set ￿￿(h) (Lemma 1) and (ii) at the margin,
money wage payments, w, and payments in kind, s, are equally costly to the ￿rm.
6 Characterization of the PME and the MTE
In this Section we characterize formally the properties of the PME and MTE described in Theorem
2 and discuss the implications of our results.
22Theorem 3. (The PME and the MTE):
(A) In any symmetric steady-state monetary equilibrium:
‘￿ = 1 (24a)
￿￿ = fw￿;s￿g; where M0 = ^ m￿ = w￿‘￿ (24b)
r￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ ￿ 1); with equality whenever barter trades occur. (24c)
(B) If ￿ 6 1, then in the PME:
s￿ = ^ k￿ = 0 (25a)
p￿ = M0(1 + ￿)r￿=[￿f0(1)] (25b)
^ C￿ = f(1) ￿ f￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(1)g=(r￿￿) > 0 (25c)
c￿ = (w￿=p￿)(1=￿x); 8! 2 Z: (25d)
(C) If ￿ > 1, then in the MTE:
s￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(1)
￿
x












^ C￿ = f(1) ￿
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fxr￿=(1 ￿ ￿)g + fx + (1 ￿ x)￿￿￿
r￿[x + (1 ￿ x)￿1￿￿]
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p￿ ; !1 2 Zb and !2 2 Zm (26d)
^ k￿ = s￿ > 0: (26e)
The competitive labor-market assumption, in conjunction with full wage and price ￿ exibility, implies
that all workers are employed in any putative symmetric equilibrium (24a). Moreover, in a monetary
equilibrium, the money stock is optimally held across each of the periods. Indeed, with m(h) = 0
8h 2 H0, ￿rms hold all of the money balances at the end of each period and in an amount just
su¢ cient to cover next period￿ s wage bill. Notice that the barter trading price is r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), as
was the case for the PBE (24c).
Inspection of (25b) and (26b) indicates that the price level is simply proportional to the (initial)
stock of money M0. Further examination of the system of equations (25) and (26) reveals that
money is neutral, as the real variables in the model are independent of M0. This ￿nding, familiar in
Walrasian models, stands in sharp contrast to much of the earlier search-money literature. Like Shi
(1997) this results arises from the assumptions that money is divisible and because agents can hold
both cash and goods. These features sever the somewhat arti￿cial link between the supply of money
and the ￿ fraction￿of money traders, which was an inherent feature of earlier search models.
23From (24b), (24c) and (25b) it follows that each household￿ s real income in the PME is:
(w￿=p￿) = [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿](1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(1)=￿: (27)
As in equation (20) the term (￿￿1)=￿ < 1; stems from the monopolistically competitive structure.
Notably, (27) di⁄ers from the real income obtained in the PBE (20) only in the inclusion of the
factor 1=￿, re￿ ecting the (possible) depreciation of goods necessarily stored under barter and the
deleterious e⁄ects of anticipated in￿ ation. A comparison of (25b) and (27) indicates that money is not
superneutral. An increase in the monetary growth rate, ￿, re-distributes wealth from households to
the owners of ￿rms. From the household￿ s perspective, the Friedman Rule which contracts the money
growth rate at the rate of time preference, ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1;would be optimal. However, because of this
redistributive e⁄ect between households and ￿rms, the equilibrium allocations resulting from di⁄erent
in￿ ation rates are Pareto non-comparable. A similar ￿nding is obtained by Casella and Feinstein
(1990), in which the monetary infusion is applied to one of two separate sectors. The underlying
nominal variables are easily recovered. For instance the nominal price level is P￿
t = p￿(1+￿)t, which
indicates a constant steady-state rate of in￿ ation that equals the monetary growth rate ￿.
In the PME workers are not paid in goods, s￿ = 0, and thus cannot subsequently engage in
barter. This implies that in equilibrium the value of the relative price r￿ is inconsequential for the
payo⁄ accruing to any given ￿rm and, indeed, that witnessing a worker with goods for sale is an
￿ out-of-equilibrium￿event. As a consequence, there are multiple equilibria, all yielding the same
payo⁄s. As a re￿nement, one may consider a perturbed game in which an exogenous fraction "0 > 0
workers are endowed at the beginning of each period with goods alone. One can then establish that,
under these circumstances, as "0 ! 0, the optimal barter goods-for-goods price is r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1).
Given this particular re￿nement, the conditions of the Theorem implies that there is no barter (as
s￿ = 0): Moreover, this is the optimal choice of r￿ if a small amount of barter were to take place.
As might be expected, the MTE possesses many features in common with both the PBE described
earlier, and the PME described above. For the purposes of the present discussion, the key feature
of the equilibrium is that s￿ > 0 and w￿ > 0, implying that monetary exchange and barter coexist.
(Moreover, since s￿ > 0; then ￿in contrast to the case of the PME ￿barter is an equilibrium event
and the price r￿ is unique and is perfectly well de￿ned.) Given that ￿ > 1 and ￿ ￿ (1+￿)(1￿￿) > 1,
it is easily seen from (26a) that ds￿=d￿ > 0. Thus, further increases in the rate of expansion of the
money supply (and hence the rate of in￿ ation) raise the steady-state volume of barter transactions.
This ￿nding is consistent with the commonly observed patterns of exchange under hyperin￿ ation in
which barter emerges, as sellers accept goods and cash payments and in which workers receive part
of their remuneration in terms of their employer￿ s output.34
34See Tallman and Wang (1995) for evidence pertaining to such exchange patterns during the post WWI German
and post WWII Chinese hyperin￿ ations. Even under moderately high in￿ ation in the confederacy at the time of the
24This result di⁄ers from those obtained by Casella and Feinstein (1990) and by Shi (1997). In
Casella and Feinstein, an increase in the monetary growth rate a⁄ects the relative bargaining power
of buyers and sellers under a given exchange protocol. Absent lump sum re-distributive taxation,
this tends to improve the steady-state welfare of sellers relative to buyers. Shi considers endogenous
exchange patterns and uncovers an interesting trading opportunity e⁄ect. This arises since each
household fails to recognize the trading externality arising from its choice of the fraction of money
holders in the family. An increase in the money growth rate encourages households to trade money
away by increasing this fraction (which promotes economic activity).35 In our model, the non-super-
neutrality result stems from the fact that we endogenize both the medium of exchange and the
means of factor payments. At higher rates of in￿ ation, each ￿rm optimally adjusts the terms of its
contractual o⁄er to workers by substituting away from cash payments towards (less costly) payments
in kind.
As we have seen earlier (Lemma 1), consumers seek to spread their periodic real incomes uniformly
across all goods they contact and desire. In view of this, the result reported in equation (26d) which
indicates that c￿
b > c￿
m, re￿ ects the distorting e⁄ects of (hyper)in￿ ation on steady-state consumption
patterns. For su¢ ciently rapid rates of monetary growth (in which ￿ > 1), consumers substitute
away from those goods they can procure through cash payments alone toward those that they can
obtain through barter. Manipulation of (26b) in conjunction with the other ￿rst-order conditions
gives (c￿
m=c￿
b) = ￿￿￿ < 1. In the limit ￿ ! 1 all goods are close (perfect) substitutes, and households
gain little from consuming a wide variety of goods. Hence, provided that ￿ > 1, they can drive their
consumption of c￿
m close to zero with little utility loss (i.e., lim￿!1(c￿
m=c￿
b) = lim￿!1 ￿￿￿ = 0). As
in the PME described above money is neutral: a once and for all anticipated increase in M0 simply
raises all prices in direct proportion without real e⁄ects. Equation (26b) implies, @2p￿=@M0@￿ _
[(1￿x)+￿x￿￿￿1] > 0. This says that increases in the initial money stock, M0 , have proportionately
greater e⁄ects on the price level, p￿, the greater is the rate of in￿ ation ￿. This conclusion that
anticipated in￿ ation crowds out real balances is often imposed as a key assumption of ad-hoc money
demand functions in the hyperin￿ ation literature. Here it is derived endogenously. It arises because,
as the volume of monetary transactions declines, a given monetary infusion (M0) is used to procure
ever fewer goods. The term x￿￿￿￿1 re￿ ects the rate at which households are willing to abandon
cash-￿nanced consumption and switch to barter. In the case of perfect substitutes, ￿ ! 1 and
hence lim￿!1 ￿￿￿￿1 ! 1. Here, even small di⁄erences in ￿ have a dramatic e⁄ect on the volume
Civil War, Lerner (1969) remarks: ￿As early as 1862 some Southern ￿rms stopped selling their products for currency
alone, and customers were forced to o⁄er commodities as well as notes to buy things.￿A notable recent illustration of
this phenomenon is Russia￿ s ￿ virtual economy,￿where payments in kind are common as barter has increased from 5%
of sales in 1992 to 45% in 1997 [cf. Ericson and Ickes (2000)].
35This is similar to the positive e⁄ect of in￿ ation on trading e⁄ort and the consequences of search externalities ￿rst
identi￿ed in the context of a ￿rst generation search theoretic model of money by Li (1995).
25of barter transactions and hence upon the sensitivity of the price level, p￿, to the money stock M0.
Casella and Feinstein (1990) obtain a similar result, but for quite di⁄erent reasons. Their model
is characterized by predetermined (monetary) exchange patterns, overlapping generations of di⁄erent
search vintages (corresponding to a buyer￿ s duration in the market), and in equilibrium a maximal
such vintage (at which point a buyer￿ s money holdings have atrophied to a point of obsolescence).
They show that increases in the monetary growth rate lead to discrete changes in this maximal
vintage and hence to discrete changes in the steady-state population of buyers in the market. As
this occurs, the average time buyers hold cash is shortened and the velocity of circulation increases.
As a consequence of this chain of events, any new (one o⁄) injection of cash has a proportionately
greater e⁄ect on prices the greater is the rate of money creation. In contrast, our ￿nding is a direct
consequence of endogenous adjustments to the aggregate volume of monetary and barter transactions
undertaken in equilibrium. This latter mechanism is precluded in Casella and Feinstein, since an
exogenous exchange role for money is prescribed a priori.
Turning now to workers￿real incomes, they are:
(w￿=p￿) + (s￿=r￿) = [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿](1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(1)
￿
x + (1 ￿ x)￿￿￿
x + (1 ￿ x)￿1￿￿
￿
: (28)
It is instructive to consider this value in the limit, lim￿!1. Consider,
Theorem 4. As the rate of monetary growth becomes arbitrarily large (i.e., lim￿!1 ), the MTE
converges to the PBE described in Theorem 1.





￿!1f(w￿=p￿) + (s￿=r￿)g = [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿]￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(1);
indicating, from equation (20), that each worker￿ s real income converges to that of the PBE (s￿=r￿)pbe.
However, for any ￿nite rate of in￿ ation the monetary component of the real wage is strictly positive
w￿=p￿ > 0 (provided of course cash is still valued). The continued circulation of money is a conse-
quence of each household￿ s preference for consumption variety. Even if ￿ is extremely large, small
holdings of real money balances allow workers to secure an additional ￿x(1 ￿ x) goods relative to
the basket they could obtain using barter alone (i.e., if w￿ = 0). By virtue of their relative scarcity
of these goods in the household￿ s consumption basket, they possess extremely high marginal utilities
of consumption and command a commensurately high ￿ willingness to pay.￿
7 Welfare Analysis
We now compare the welfare properties of the PBE and PME. In order to ensure the conditions
of Theorem 2 are satis￿ed assume throughout that ￿ 6 1. First, what elements of our model are
26essential for monetary exchange to improve welfare relative to barter? Second, what are the welfare
implications in the limiting case where trade frictions vanish? Theorems 1 and 3 may be used to
compute each agent￿ s steady-state lifetime discounted utility in the PBE (b) and the PME (m),























^ V ￿m = (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 [f(‘￿) ￿ (w￿=p￿)‘￿]: (30d)
Using equations (20) and (27), it is readily veri￿ed that periodic real incomes in the PBE and in
the PME may be written as (s￿=r￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(‘￿) and (w￿=p￿) = (s￿=r￿)=￿ respectively. In
order to better understand the role played by trade frictions, ￿, and by the problem of the double
coincidence of wants, x 6 x2 6 1, it is instructive to ￿rst examine the benchmark case in which goods
are perfectly storable (￿ = 0) and in which there is no monetary growth (￿ = 0). In this case ￿ = 1
and, as a result, (w￿=p￿) = (s￿=r￿). With these, we have
Theorem 5. (Welfare properties of the PBE and the PME with ￿ = ￿ = 0).
(A) ^ V ￿m = ^ V ￿b
(B) For ￿nite ￿ if (a) x < 1, then V ￿b < V ￿m and (b) x = 1, then V ￿m = V ￿b.
Given that ￿ = ￿ = 0, then owners are equally well o⁄in either the PBE or the PME. This is natural:
they have no preference for consumption variety and under the conditions of the Theorem, there is
neither an intrinsic disadvantage of barter (depreciation of inventory) nor of monetary exchange
(in￿ ation). However, Theorem 5 shows that even with (w￿=p￿) = (s￿=r￿), workers￿welfare levels are
strictly lower in the PBE than in the PME whenever ￿ < 1 and x < 1. The drawback of barter
exchange is that the problem of the double coincidence of wants stymies the variety of the resultant
consumption basket [which may be seen by comparing x > x2 in equations (30a) and (30c)]. However,
if x = 1, agents are ￿ generalists￿in consumption. Accordingly, all trades are bene￿cial, and hence are
consummated in the equilibrium.36
The welfare properties of the general model in which ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 then follow in a straight-
forward manner. An increase in the depreciation rate of goods, ￿, lowers the steady-state welfare of
both households and ￿rms in the PBE, leaving welfare levels in the PME unchanged. Similarly, an
increase in the monetary growth rate, ￿; is deleterious (to households) in the PME, but irrelevant in
the PBE since money is not valued.
36The PBE and the PME converge in welfare terms as trade frictions vanish and there are no more limitation on
consumption varieties (i.e., ￿ ! 1, with N ! 1 and Z0 ! 1).
278 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a model where decentralized exchange is occurs through the multiple match-
ing of buyers and sellers. The resultant structure that highlights the necessary role of trade frictions
in explaining the use of money resembles how market exchange for goods and labor services are
organized in modern economies. As such, it has proven to be highly tractable and we have used it
to examine the endogenous patterns of exchange and pricing, as well as how in￿ ationary monetary
policies a⁄ects these equilibrium trading outcomes.
We believe that the framework admits a number of interesting extensions. One direction of
research, already underway in Laing, Li, and Wang (2007), is to analyze the real e⁄ects of money
growth and in￿ ation in a production economy where labor supply decisions are endogenous. There
have been a number of developments in the money-search literature [e.g., Li (1995) and Wallace
(1997)] suggesting that this additional channel by which money growth a⁄ects the very frictions
which cause money to circulate has important e⁄ects on welfare and real economic activity precluded
by standard Walrasian monetary models. We believe our framework is very amenable to studying
these traditional macroeconomic issues. In future work we intend to incorporate a variety of assets
(including share holdings and dividend payments) as well as a credit market. This exercise expands
the scope of instruments at the government￿ s disposal and permits a much richer analysis of the
e⁄ects of monetary policy. The lack of a precautionary savings motive and the model￿ s complete
symmetry lead to a simple degenerate distribution of cash balances ex post, with ￿rms holding all
of the money in the economy at the end of each period. If instead, we assume that households
are subject either to idiosyncratic taste shocks or shocks to their endowment of human capital, a
non-degenerate cash distribution would emerge in equilibrium. In this case it would be of interest to
solve for the distribution and to explore the e⁄ects of monetary policy on such distributions. Finally,
the explicit inclusion of ￿rms is signi￿cant. This feature provides a natural forum for admitting
endogenous capital accumulation and for thus exploring the links between in￿ ation and growth.
These are enduring and important issues in monetary theory, but until recently they have proven to
be di¢ cult subjects of study when viewed under the conceptual lens of extant search theory.
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(Appendix A and a major portion of Appendix B is not intended for publication.)
Appendix A: Justi￿cation of Assumption (3a)
We demonstrate that a suitable choice of a Wicksell preference/production structures ensures only
household-￿rm trades arise in equilibrium, thus endogenizing the main features of Assumption (3a).
For this purpose, assume that there are J > 3 separate classes of goods and types of households
indexed j = 1,2,...,J. Within each class normalize the measure of ￿rms and households to unity.
Assume that households in class j (i) consume only goods that belong to class j+ 1 (all modulo J)
and (ii) possess the skills necessary for working in any ￿rm in class j. Assume that the owner of a
￿rm in class j derives utility from either their own good or goods in class j- 1. Under this schema,
household-household trades do not arise in equilibrium. A household that owns inventory in class j
desires goods in class j+ 1. However, households who work for ￿rms in class j+ 1 desire goods in
class j+ 2 and so on. Inter-￿rm trades do not arise for similar reasons. However, household-￿rm
trades may arise. A household in class j desires goods in j+ 1 and the owner of a ￿rm that produces
goods in class j+ 1 desires goods in (j + 1) ￿ 1 = j:
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas 1￿ 3 and Theorems 1￿ 5
Consider the recurrence relation V = U+￿V+1 given in (8a) corresponding to a generic household h 2
H who is employed by some ￿rm !0 (recall the shorthand, V = V (kt;mt) and V+1 = V (kt+1;mt+1)).
To ease the notational burden we eschew writing Z(h) and so on, preferring the shorter Z:
Assume that s > 0 and that w > 0 (if sw = 0 the problem is trivial). According to equation
(7) c(!) ￿ c(!)b + c(!)m. Consequently, we can write the following constraints for each good in the
double-coincidence set Zb;
c(!) ￿ c(!)b > 0 and c(!)b > 0; for all ! 2 Zb; [￿(!)b] (B1)
where ￿(!)b is the (nonnegative) Lagrange multiplier associated with c(!)￿c(!)b > 0 [i.e., c(!)m ￿ 0]
for each ! 2 Zb [c(!)b = 0 for ! 2 Zm as barter is infeasible]. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect
to fc(!)j!2Zm;c(!)j!2ZB;c(!)bg and the Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions with respect to fk;mg
31are:
￿c￿1=￿ = p(!)(1 + ￿)￿1￿Vm; ! 2 Zm (B2a)
￿c￿1=￿ = p(!)(1 + ￿)￿1￿Vm ￿ ￿b; ! 2 Zb (B2b)





Comp.; ! 2 Zb (B2c)
k ￿ Vk(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) = 0 (B2d)
m ￿ Vm(1 ￿ (1 + ￿)￿1) = 0 (B2e)
where ￿ ￿ [@U=@D]D1=(￿￿1) and ￿Comp￿refers to a complementary slackness condition.
Lemma 1
By assumption ￿ < 1, (1￿￿) 6 1, and (1+￿) > 1. It is then immediate from the complementary
slackness conditions (B2d) and (B2e) k = m = 0. This follows as Vk > 0 and Vm > 0, from
(B2a)￿ (B2c) establishing Lemma 1.
Lemma 2
(a) This part is trivial: consumers desire and can purchase only those goods that belong to the set
Z:
The demand functions for each of the goods belonging to Z are determined from the ￿rst-order
conditions presented above, together (in view of Lemma 1) with the stationary inventory and cash
evolution equations (3.2b) and (3.2c). A number of cases must be considered, in view of the comple-
mentary slackness condition (B2c).
For example, suppose that ￿(!)b > 0 for all ! 2 Zb: From complementary slackness, c(!) =
c(!)b > 0 for all such !. Yet, it is then immediate that (B2c) must hold with equality for all ! 2 Zb
and that (B2b) can be written,
￿c￿1=￿ = r(!;!0)(1 ￿ ￿)￿Vk; ! 2 Zb (B2b0)










Integrating both sides over Zm (with respect to u); and using the cash-evolution equation (3.2b) that
w =
R
Zm p(u)c(u)du gives (11). Similar manipulations, applied to equation (B2b0), imply (10).
32Great simplicity is a⁄orded by considering the consumer￿ s demand for a generic product ! 2 Z at
the prices p = p(!) and r = r(!;!0) when a.e other producers set prices p = p(u) and r = r(u;!0)
for u 2 ^ Zb (and zero otherwise).
(b) To begin, we note that ￿ [Zb] = ￿x2 and ￿ [Zm] = ￿x(1 ￿ x). There are two cases to consider.
(b1) Let (w=p) > (s=r)[(1 ￿ x)=x]. If ￿b > 0, then c(!) = c(!)b) from complementary slackness.
Also (B2a) and (B2b) give c(!1) < c(!2), where !1 2 Zm and !2 2 Zb. Constraints (8b) and
(8c) imply cb = (s=r)=(￿x2) > cm = (w=p)=(￿x(1 ￿ x)). This contradicts (a). It follows that
￿b = 0 and that c = c(!); 8! 2 Zm [ Zb. Notice that in this case household income equals and the
integral over the associated consumption yields a measure of ￿ [Zm [ Zb] = ￿x2 + ￿x(1 ￿ x) = ￿x.
Constraints (8b) and (8c) give cb = (s=r)=￿x2; and w=p = ￿xc ￿ ￿x2cb. In turn this yields, c =
f(w=p) + (s=r)g=(￿x) > cb.
(b2) Let, (w=p) < (s=r)[(1 ￿ x)=x]. If ￿b = 0, then the previous argument gives f(w=p) +
(s=r)g=(￿x) > cb = (s=r)=(￿x2) a contradiction. So ￿b > 0, implying that c(!) = cb; 8! 2 Zb. The
constraints (8b) and (8c) then yield c(!1) = (w=p)=(￿x(1 ￿ x)) < c(!2) = (s=r)=(￿x2); 8!1 2 Zm
and !2 2 Zb.
(c) For this part, consider the good ! 2 Z (with prices q = (p;r)); and any other generic good
u 2 Z n f!g (with prices q = (p;r)):
>From (B2a) and from (B2b),
(c(!)=c(u))￿(1=￿) = (p=p);where ! 2 Zm; and either u 2 Zm or u 2 Zb and c(u)b = 0 (B3a)
(c(!)=c(u))￿(1=￿) = (r=r);where ! 2 Zb; and either u 2 Zb or u 2 Zm and c(u)b > 0 (B3b)
The demand functions reported in part (c2) of the Lemma are derived as follows. First consider,
w=p < [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r). The argument used to prove part (b) implies, ￿b > 0 and c = cb =
(s=r)=(￿x2) (8u 2 Zb ) > cm = (w=p)=[￿x(1 ￿ x)] (8u 2 Zm). Equations (B3a) and (B3b) give,
c(!)b = c(!) = cb(r=r)￿; if cb > 0; (B4a)
c(!)m = c(!) = cm(p=p)￿; otherwise (B4b)
Also, since ￿(!)b > 0; c(!)b > c(!)m. The R.H.S of (B4a) is decreasing in r. Recall that ^ ￿ ￿
f((1 ￿ x)=x)(s=r)(p=w)g￿. Thus, using (B4a), (B4b), in conjunction with Lemma 3 gives,
c(!) = (s=￿rx2)(r=r)￿; if r 6 ^ ￿(r=p) and ! 2 Zb (B5a)
c(!) = (w=￿px(1 ￿ x))(p=p)￿; if ! 2 Zm or if r > ^ ￿(r=p) and ! 2 Zb (B5b)
Equations (B5a)-(B5b) are compactly written by de￿ning the indicator function ￿b as is done in the
Lemma. Case (c1) follows analogously. Finally, part (c3) follows from the complementary slackness
33condition reported in (B2c). If s = 0, the consumer￿ s demand functions are derived directly from
(8b), (8c), and (B2a) with cb = 0. Likewise if w = 0, then (8b), (8c), and (B2b), are used.
Theorem 1 (The PBE)
Given the stationary values (s;r), equations (18) in the text uniquely de￿ne the representative ￿rm￿ s
best response behavior. Since f(‘) is strictly concave, there is a unique value s￿ at which point
(1 ￿ ￿)￿f0(‘￿) = s￿ and ‘￿ = 1. If ^ C > 0, then complementary slackness gives, r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) as
the unique best response for r. However, under Condition U, ^ C = 0 is impossible. This follows as
f￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)g=￿ 6 1; and the strict concavity of f(￿) implies
^ C=‘￿ = f(‘￿) ￿ f0(‘￿)f￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)g=￿ > f(‘￿)=‘￿ ￿ f0(‘￿) > 0
establishing the uniqueness of s￿;r￿; ‘￿. Equation (18e) implies that ￿b > 0. Hence, from comple-
mentary slackness and (17d), k￿ = s￿‘￿. Finally, Lemma 1 gives consumers￿equilibrium demands as
c(!)￿ = (s￿=r￿)=(￿x2) for all ! 2 Zb.
Theorems 2 and 3 (Monetary Exchange)
Let ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) < 1. We ￿rst establish that with ￿ < 1 there is a stationary PME
and characterize its properties (parts (A) and (B) of Theorem 3). Given that s￿ = 0, the basic
proof of the uniqueness of the symmetric steady-state equilibrium is virtually the same as that used
in Theorem 1 above, once obvious adjustments are made to the ￿rst-order conditions analogous to
(10) reported in the text. The only caveat is that we must prove that it is not optimal for a ￿rm
to defect from the proposed equilibrium and to o⁄er workers s > 0, contrary to the Theorem. Let
(s￿;r￿;c￿;w￿;p￿;‘￿) be the values reported in parts (A) and (B) of Theorem 3. In the proposed
equilibrium the ￿rm is assured a periodic utility,
^ C￿ = f(‘￿) ￿ (w￿=p￿)‘￿ > 0 (B6)
Consider an arbitrary ￿rm, ! , that sets q = (p;r) and o⁄ers s > 0 (if s = 0, there is nothing to
prove). Let ’, ￿B and ￿M be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with (23d)-(23f), respectively.




, evaluated in steady
state, are easily derived with the aid of the recurrence relation ^ V = c + ￿ ^ V+1 and the results that
￿B = ^ Vk and ￿M = ^ Vm,
^ Vk = 1=￿(1 ￿ ￿)
f0(‘) = s^ Vk + w^ Vm
￿^ Vm + ’=p￿ = 0
^ Vk + ’=r￿ = 0 (s > 0)
￿=p￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ Vm=￿
34where ^ Vj = dV=dj, j = k;m. Simple manipulation of these conditions, noting r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) and
’ > 0, gives,
p=p￿ = ￿ < 1
￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(‘)=r￿ = w￿=p￿
w=p￿ + s=r￿ = (w￿=p￿)
However, since ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f0(‘￿)=(r￿￿) = w￿=p￿, it implies that ‘￿ ￿ ‘, as ￿ < 1 and f(￿) is strictly
concave. Under the proposed defection, the ￿rm￿ s steady-state periodic payo⁄ is derived from k =
s‘ = (1 ￿ ￿)ff(‘) ￿ ^ C ￿ ￿x‘￿cmg and cm = c￿(p￿=p)￿ as,
^ C = f(‘) ￿ [s‘=(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ ￿x‘￿c￿(p￿=p)￿
= f(‘) ￿ [s‘=(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ ‘￿(w￿=p￿)￿￿￿ (B7)
where (B7) follows as p￿=p = ￿ and c￿ = (1=￿x)(w￿=p￿): Finally, comparing (B7) and the steady-
state payo⁄ (B6), gives
^ C￿ ￿ ^ C = ff(‘￿) ￿ f(‘)g + ‘￿(w￿=p￿)f￿￿￿ ￿ 1g + s=(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 (B8)
The inequality in (B8) follows since, ‘￿ ￿ ‘;(1=￿)￿ ￿ 1, and s > 0. This establishes that it is
strictly sub-optimal for the ￿rm to defect from the proposed equilibrium and to o⁄er s > 0 given
that r￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1).
Next, given employment per ￿rm L, prices q = (p;r) and labor contracts v =(w;s), the owner
of ￿rm ! solves the following program
(P) ^ V (^ k; ^ m) = max[ ^ C + Lx2rcb + ￿ ^ V (^ k+1; ^ m+1)]
s:t: m0(1 + ￿) = [^ m + ￿M0 + ￿xLp[(1 ￿ x)c(!1)m + xc(!2)m ￿ w‘]; 8!1 2 ^ ZM; !2 2 ^ ZB
^ k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿xL[(1 ￿ x)c(!1) + xc(!2)] ￿ ^ C]; 8!1 2 ^ ZM; !2 2 ^ ZB
U[D] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ V
^ k ￿ s‘
^ m ￿ w‘
The basic strategy of proof is virtually identical to that used above. The only caveat is that ￿
as indicated by Lemma 2(C) - there is a discontinuity in the means used by consumers to ￿nance
their purchases from ￿rm !. This must be dealt with before the ￿rm￿ s best-response function is
derived. For this purpose we introduce a convexi￿cation that avoids the discontinuity and ensures
that households and ￿rms accrue payo⁄s at least as great as without it. Call this extended program
35(P*). We show that the solution of the extended program (P*) is also a solution of (P). Consider ￿rm
! and recall that ^ ZB is the set of the ￿rm￿ s customers that satisfy the double coincidence of wants. The
convexi￿cation takes the following form. We assume that the ￿rm assigns to each member !00 2 ZB
the indicator I(!;!00) 2 f0;1g. If I = 0 the household must ￿nance all their purchases using goods,
while if I = 1 the customer must use money. The ￿rm chooses ￿(!) ￿ Pr[I(!;!00) = 0j!00 2 ZB].
Under this scheme, the ￿rm￿ s receipts are continuous in its prices q. The ￿rm￿ s demand functions
are given by the following conditions:
(a) If (w=p)[(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r), then
c(!)b = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(r=r)￿ if ! 2 ZB and I(!;!00) = 0 (B9a)
c(!)m = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(p=p)￿ otherwise: (B9b)
(b) If (w=p) < [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r), then
c(!)b = (1=￿x2)fs=rg(r=r)￿; if ! 2 ZB and I(!;!00) = 0 (B9c)
c(!)m = (1=￿x(1 ￿ x))f(w=p)g(p=p)￿; otherwise (B9d)
Under the convexi￿cation, the ￿rm solves
(P￿) ^ V (^ k; ^ m) = max
f￿; ^ C;￿;qg
[ ^ C + L￿x2r￿cb + ^ V (^ k+1; ^ m+1)]
s:t: ^ m+1(1 + ￿) = [^ m + ￿M0 + ￿xLp[(1 ￿ x￿)cm ￿ w‘] (B10a)
^ k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿xL[(1 ￿ ￿x)cm + ￿xcb] ￿ ^ C] (B10b)
U[D] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿1V0 (B10c)
^ k ￿ s‘ (B10d)
^ m ￿ w‘ (B10e)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 (B10f)
where cm and cb are given by equations (B9), ’;￿B;￿M are (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers on the
constraints (B10c)-(B10e), and ￿￿ is a Lagrange multiplier on the constraint 1 ￿ ￿ , ensuring that the
mixing probability cannot exceed unity. To show that P￿ implements P, let (w=p)[(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r).
In Program (P), we consider three cases.
(a) r < r(p=p) : then c(!) = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(p=p)￿ for ! 2 ZM and c(!) = c(!)b =
f(w=p) + (s=r)g(r=r)￿ for ! 2 ZB . Program (P) gives
^ V (^ k; ^ m) = [ ^ C + ￿Lx2rc + ^ V (^ k+1; ^ m+1)] (B11a)
^ m+1(1 + ￿) = [^ m + ￿M0 + ￿xLp[(1 ￿ x)cm ￿ w‘] (B11b)
^ k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k+f(‘)-s‘- ￿xL[(1- x)c(!1) + xc(!2)] ￿ ^ C]; ! 2 ^ ZM, !2 2 ^ ZB (B11c)
36In Program (P*), let ￿ = 1 and the same set of conditions can be obtained. This shows (P￿) =) (P):
(b) r > r(p=p) : then in (P) c(!) = cm = (1=￿x)f(w=p)+(s=r)g(p=p)￿ > cb = 0; 8! 2 ZB [ZM. In
this case,
^ V (^ k; ^ m) = [ ^ C + ￿ ^ V (^ k+1; ^ m+1)]
^ m+1(1 + ￿) = [^ m + ￿M0 + xLpcm ￿ w‘]
^ k+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿xLcm] ￿ ^ C]
In (P*) setting ￿ = 0 produces the same set of conditions.
(c) r = r(p=p): then in (P) c(!) = (1=￿x)f(w=p) + (s=r)g(p=p)￿ ￿ cb . In (P*) setting ￿ =
f(1=x)(s=r)g=f(w=p) + (s=r)g ￿ 1 implements (P). Similar arguments for (w=p) < [(1 ￿ x)=x](s=r)










1 ￿ ^ Vk￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0; ^ C ￿ 0; [1 ￿ ^ V ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ^ C = 0 (B12a)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ^ V f(‘)0 = s^ Vk + w^ Vm (B12b)
￿x2L￿cb
(
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ^ Vk
r
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
)
= 0 (B12c)
￿x(1 ￿ ￿x)￿VML(1 + ￿)￿1f￿((^ Vk=^ VM)(￿=p)) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)g = 0 (B12d)






￿^ Vmw + ’￿Dw ￿ 0; and w ￿ 0 (B12f)
￿^ Vks + ’￿Ds = 0; and s ￿ 0 (B12g)
^ m = w‘ = ￿xL(1 ￿ x)pcm (B12h)
^ k = s‘ = (1 ￿ ￿)f^ k + f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ ￿xL[(1 ￿ x)cm + xcb] ￿ ^ Cg (B12i)
where ￿ ￿ [@U=@D](D)1=(￿￿1); Dw ￿ @D=@w; and Ds ￿ @D=@s. There are three subcases to
consider.
(i) Let ￿ < 1. Condition U implies that ^ C > 0, in which case ^ Vk = 1=[￿(1 ￿ ￿)]. Assume that
s￿ > 0 and that (w￿=p￿) > [(1￿x)=x](s￿=r￿) [if s￿ = 0, there is nothing to prove]. Equations (B12d)
and (B12f)-(B12g) yield, respectively, ￿^ Vk=^ Vm = (p￿=r￿) = ^ Vk=^ Vm , which is a contradiction. Now
suppose that, 0 < (w￿=p￿) < [(1￿x)=x](s￿=r￿). In this case (B12f)-(B12g) give ^ Vk=^ Vm = (Dw=Ds) =
[((1 ￿ x)p￿s￿)=(r￿w￿x)](r￿=p￿). Equations (B12c) and (B12d) imply, (r￿=p￿)￿ = VM=Vk. It follows
that 1 > ￿ = [((1 ￿ x)p￿s￿)=(r￿w￿x)]1=￿ > 1, which is a contradiction. Consequently, whenever
37￿ < 1 then s￿ = 0 is the only candidate equilibrium. Part (a) of the proof establishes the existence
of the PME under these circumstances. Thus (P*) implements (P) with s = s = s￿ = 0 and ￿00 = 0.
(ii) Let ￿ > 1. In any putative symmetric steady-state equilibrium L = ‘ = ‘￿; r = r = r￿ etc.
Suppose that ￿ > 1, Condition U is satis￿ed, and that contrary to claim that ￿00 < 1 and ^ C￿ > 0.
Then ￿￿ = 0 from complementary slackness. Also, using (B12c) and (B12d) in (B12e) gives,
(c￿
b ￿ c￿
m)(r￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 0
which implies, c￿
b ￿ c￿
m as r￿ > 1. Thus,
[(w￿r￿)=(s￿p￿)]f1 ￿ xg=(x)
Also, (B12f) and (B12g) give,
(w￿=s￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)^ Vm = (1 ￿ x)=(x)
Hence,
[(w￿r￿)=(s￿p￿)]￿ = f1 ￿ xg=(x) ￿ [(w￿r￿)=(s￿p￿)]
which is a contradiction, as ￿ > 1. Thus, ￿00 < 1 and ^ C￿ > 0 is not optimal. Tedious manipulation
of the ￿rst order conditions shows that under Condition U, that ^ C￿ > 0. Thus, in any putative
equilibrium ￿00 = 1 and ^ C￿ > 0. It is straightforward to verify that the expressions reported in
Theorem 3 are the unique solutions to the optimality conditions (B12) for (P*). This is also a
solution to Program (P) at r = (r=p)p and s=r ￿ (w=p)[x=(1 ￿ x)].
(iii) Let ￿ = 1: In this case, the arguments used in part (a) of the proof show that s￿ = 0 uniquely
de￿nes a stationary symmetric PME.
Theorems 4 and 5 (Convergence and Welfare)
Theorem 4 is a direct consequence of Theorems 1 and 3, noting that lim￿!1 ￿￿￿1 = 0, since
￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 1 > 0. Theorem 5 follows from Theorem 1 and 3 and equations (18).
38